Financials

Financials in One Page

Gogoro is a sub-scale Taiwanese electric two-wheeler and battery-swap operator whose income statement, cash flow, and balance sheet all point to the same conclusion: the business has been burning cash faster than it grows, but FY2025 marks the first credible inflection. Revenue contracted to $281M in FY2025 (down 9.4% YoY, down 36% from the FY2019 peak of $439M) as Taiwan scooter demand collapsed and the EZZY launch slipped, yet the revenue mix crossed a milestone — battery-swapping service revenue ($149M, 665K subscribers) overtook hardware ($133M) for the first time. Gross margin, which had collapsed to 2.6% in FY2024 under EV credit reversals and inventory write-downs, recovered to 8.2% in FY2025 and then to 20.4% in Q1 FY2026 — the strongest print since the SPAC year. Free cash flow improved from -$115M to -$29M as capex was cut roughly in half (from $124M to $65M) while operating cash flow rose. The balance sheet remains the weak link: $70M cash against $413M debt (net debt $343M) and $93M of debt due in the next twelve months, with shareholders' equity halved over four years and a 1-for-20 reverse split in August 2025 already on the tape. Valuation at $4/share leaves a $64M market cap (price down ~98% from the SPAC reference of $199) versus tangible book value of ~$108M — the market is pricing in solvency risk, not growth. The single financial metric that matters most right now is gross margin, because Q1 FY2026's jump to 20% is what would let battery-swap unit economics translate into FCF breakeven and validate that the recurring-revenue thesis is more than a slide.

A few terms used throughout this page:

Free Cash Flow (FCF) is the cash a business generates after the capital spending it needs to maintain and grow operations — calculated here as operating cash flow minus capex. For Gogoro, FCF has been deeply negative because battery-swap stations (GoStations) and battery inventory are capex-heavy.

EBITDA strips out depreciation, amortization, interest, and tax from operating profit. Useful for a battery-swap business because depreciation of GoStations and batteries is large and non-cash; it distorts headline GAAP profit but does not consume cash.

Net Debt / EBITDA measures leverage in years-of-cash-earnings-to-debt. Above 4x is generally considered stretched for a non-financial; below 2x is comfortable.

Quality Score / Fair Value / Altman Z / Piotroski F — third-party scoring data was unavailable for GGR in this run, so this page relies on raw financials rather than synthetic scores.

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Revenue, Margins, and Earnings Power

Gogoro's revenue line tells the most important story: the company stopped growing in 2019, and after five years of low-single-digit fluctuations it has begun to shrink. Revenue peaked at $439M in FY2019, never recovered post-COVID, and rolled over to $281M in FY2025. The collapse in FY2025 hardware sales (-23% YoY) was offset only partly by the recurring battery-swap revenue line (+8% YoY), so the top line contracted by 9.4%. The earnings line has been negative every year on record; what matters now is whether the margin structure is finally improving.

The FY2022 operating loss of -$298M is misleading: it embeds a non-cash listing expense from the SPAC merger with Poema Global. Stripping that out, the underlying operating burn has run between $50M and $140M per year. FY2024 was the worst on an underlying basis as gross margin collapsed (see below); FY2025's improvement to a -$73M operating loss is the first real progress.

Note: FY2022 op margin shown is normalized; the unadjusted -77.9% reflects the SPAC listing expense.

The gross margin line is the most important on this page. The FY2024 collapse to 2.6% was driven by Taiwan EV-incentive resets, model-year transition inventory, and an unprofitable hardware mix. FY2025's recovery to 8.2% is supported by the segment mix shift toward battery-swapping (a ~50% gross-margin recurring revenue line). And the quarterly trajectory is where the inflection is visible.

The quarterly picture is the bull case in two charts. Revenue has not yet re-accelerated — Q1 FY2026 is the smallest quarter in three years — but gross margin has moved from -7% in Q4 FY2024 (when inventory was written down) to 20.4% in Q1 FY2026, a level last reached in FY2020. The improvement looks structural, not seasonal: it reflects a higher battery-swap mix (a recurring service line at ~50%+ gross), lower hardware cost absorption (capex cut), and the absence of one-time inventory charges. If the 20% gross-margin run-rate holds, $50M of quarterly opex against $14M of gross profit per quarter still leaves an operating loss — but a much smaller one than the $25M run-rate of 2024.

Bottom line on earnings power: GGR has no profit history and is not earning its cost of capital today, but the margin structure has just begun to look like something a battery-swap subscription business should look like. The earnings power thesis depends entirely on holding that 20% gross-margin print and cutting opex toward it.

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Cash Flow and Earnings Quality

A loss-making company's most important question is whether the losses are cash losses or accounting losses. For Gogoro the answer is: most of the depreciation is non-cash, so operating cash flow has been positive most years even when GAAP earnings were deeply negative — but capex has consumed everything OCF could produce and then some.

Two patterns to notice:

1. Operating cash flow is consistently better than reported net income because depreciation of GoStations and swap batteries is large and non-cash. FY2025 OCF of $36M against a net loss of $80M reflects ~$91M of depreciation. This is normal for an infrastructure-heavy subscription business.
2. Capex was the killer until FY2025. Eight years of $120M-$180M annual capex against ~$370M of revenue is a capex-to-sales ratio between 32% and 40%, which can only work in a high-growth phase. The cut to $65M in FY2025 (capex / revenue of 23%) is the single most material change in the cash-flow profile. It signals that the GoStation buildout is reaching saturation in Taiwan and that battery refresh cycles are slowing.

Verdict on earnings quality: Reported losses overstate the cash drain because depreciation is real but non-cash. Underlying cash earnings (OCF) are positive and have been most years. The cash bleed has always come from capex, not operations. With capex cut in FY2025, the FCF deficit narrowed dramatically — from -$115M to -$29M, the smallest annual gap since 2021. If capex stays at $65M and OCF recovers as the margin inflection holds, FCF breakeven is within reach within two years. Watch this gap close or widen each quarter.

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Balance Sheet and Financial Resilience

The balance sheet is the area where the bull case has the least room to maneuver. Cash has been depleted from $236M at SPAC merger to $70M today; debt is sticky at around $410M; equity has been cut in half; and $93M of debt is current. This is a company financing itself by rolling over short-term Taiwanese bank debt while it tries to engineer a margin turnaround.

Three resilience signals matter:

Current ratio of 0.76: Current liabilities of $172M exceed current assets of $131M by $41M. The company has more bills due in the next twelve months than near-term assets to pay them with. This is acceptable in a working-capital-light subscription business that bills in advance — but Gogoro is not yet that business.

$93M of debt is current: The company has historically rolled over Taiwanese bank lines without issue, but a refinancing failure at the wrong moment would be existential. Debt issuance ($87M) almost exactly matched repayments ($97M) in FY2025, evidencing that rollover access is intact today but tight.

Net debt / EBITDA of ~14x at FY2025 is meaningless precisely (EBITDA is barely positive), but it does signal that leverage cannot be carried by current cash earnings. The metric only normalizes if EBITDA expands meaningfully — which is the same gross-margin bet that drives the earnings story.

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Returns, Reinvestment, and Capital Allocation

For a company with no profit history, returns analysis is essentially an analysis of how much shareholder value the business is destroying per dollar of capital deployed. Every reported ROE, ROA, and ROIC has been negative since IPO.

Note on share counts: All share counts have been restated for the 1-for-20 reverse split effected on 2025-10-06 (per Q3 2025 earnings release footnote). The reverse split was a Nasdaq-listing compliance action, not a capital event.

The story of Gogoro's capital allocation is straightforward and painful:

1. The company has never returned capital to shareholders. No dividends, no buybacks. The "stock buybacks" line in the cash-flow statement in FY2022 ($327M) and FY2024 ($75M) is a Fiscal data-mapping artifact — these are SPAC merger trust proceeds and a 2024 PIPE issuance, not buybacks. Net of stock issuance, the company has been a serial issuer.
2. Capex has been the entire capital story — $933M cumulative since FY2019, against $2.5B of cumulative revenue. Gogoro has reinvested 37 cents of every revenue dollar into GoStations and batteries. That investment built a moat (the largest battery-swap network in Asia by station count) but has not yet earned its cost of capital because the consumer-facing hardware business cannot absorb the depreciation.
3. Share count has expanded from 9.7M (pre-SPAC) to 15.9M (Q1 FY2026), a 64% dilution. Book value per share has fallen from $22.5 in FY2019 to $7.3 in FY2025 — a 68% decline in per-share equity.
4. The Gold Sino Assets transaction announced March 2026 (31.4% → 49% via $16.7M at $3.15/share) injects ~$16.7M of liquidity but increases majority-shareholder concentration toward de facto control. This is a defensive financing, not a strategic one.

Verdict on capital allocation: Management has reinvested aggressively into a long-duration infrastructure business and is starting to throttle reinvestment now that the network is built. The judgment call is whether the historical capex was excessive (which a 68% decline in book value per share suggests) or whether the optionality created justifies the cost (which the 665K subscriber base and 50%+ battery-swap-segment gross margin would support). Either way, capital allocation flexibility is now severely constrained — there is nothing left to spend.

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Segment and Unit Economics

Gogoro reports two revenue streams: hardware (scooters and accessories, plus battery sales to PBGN partners) and battery-swapping service revenue (subscription fees from end-customers using GoStations). FY2025 is the first year battery-swap revenue exceeded hardware — a structural milestone for the business model.

Why this section is the single most important non-margin slide on the page:

The hardware segment is shrinking because Taiwan scooter unit sales fell 46% in FY2025 (a combination of macro weakness, model-launch delay for the EZZY platform, and a -5.9% overall Taiwan scooter market). Hardware revenue is cyclical, low-margin, and capex-heavy.

Battery-swap service revenue grew 8% to $149M against just a 4% subscriber increase to 665K. The implied ARPU expansion (~$224 per subscriber annually, up from ~$215) reflects price increases and battery-plan mix. This is recurring revenue with materially higher gross margins than hardware, and it scales with the installed GoStation base — which has already been built.

Unit economics implied: $149M / 665K subscribers = ~$224/subscriber/year. If 50% gross margins on the swap business hold (the company has guided to this range in transcripts), the contribution per subscriber is ~$112/year. With the GoStation network depreciation already capitalized, every incremental subscriber drops most of that contribution to FCF.

The earnings power conclusion: Hardware is a melting ice cube; battery-swap is a slow-growth annuity. The mix shift mechanically improves margins, which is exactly what the income statement is starting to show. But the rate of mix shift is gradual, and the absolute revenue base will keep shrinking until hardware bottoms or India scales — neither of which is visible in the FY2025 numbers.

Geography segment data is not disclosed in sufficient granularity to chart; the company reports Taiwan as ~95% of revenue (per 20-F MD&A), with India (Hero MotoCorp partnership), Indonesia, the Philippines, and Israel together accounting for the remainder.

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Valuation and Market Expectations

Valuation for a loss-making, balance-sheet-constrained micro-cap should be framed as an answer to a single question: what does the market think this business is worth versus what tangible value the balance sheet says it has? For Gogoro, the answer is "less than book value, more than zero, and priced for survival not growth."

Note: FY2026 column uses the latest spot price ($4.00 as of 2026-05-29) against FY2025 revenue and book value. FY2021 multiples are not meaningful because the company was pre-merger.

Choosing the right multiple for Gogoro: P/E and EV/EBITDA are meaningless because earnings and EBITDA are negative. P/FCF is meaningless for the same reason. The two metrics that actually have signal are:

EV/Sales ($406M / $281M = 1.44x) — meaningful because revenue is real and the question is whether the business is worth ~1.4x sales given its growth (-9%), margin trajectory (recovering), and leverage (high). Yadea trades at ~0.6x EV/Sales as a profitable scale leader; NIU trades at less than 0.1x EV/Sales (cash-rich micro-cap); Ola Electric trades at ~3-4x EV/Sales on India-EV optionality. Gogoro's 1.4x sits in the middle and is most fairly compared against NIU.

Price/Book ($64M / $108M = 0.59x) — meaningful because tangible book value is the floor in a distressed scenario. The market is saying the equity is worth ~60 cents on the dollar of stated book. That discount reflects (a) the FY2025 net loss continuing to eat book, (b) refinancing risk on $93M of current debt, and (c) controlling-shareholder concentration.

A simple bear/base/bull frame:

Bottom line on valuation: at $4, the equity is priced for an outcome between bear and base. The market is not paying for battery-swap subscription economics; it is pricing balance-sheet risk. The asymmetry is real — the difference between a forced equity raise at $2 and FCF breakeven at $9 spans 5x of stock price — but the asymmetry is driven by financial-risk binary outcomes, not by margin improvement. Cheap on book value, fair on revenue, distressed on leverage.

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Peer Financial Comparison

Comparing a $64M micro-cap to a $10B incumbent is structurally unfair, but it is the right exercise: the question is whether the public equity market gives Gogoro any credit at all for the battery-swap moat versus the diversified two-wheeler universe. The peer set is held to the same definitions as data/competition/peer_set.json.

Notes on peer figures: NIU, Yamaha, Hero, Yadea, and Ola revenue/margin figures are full-year FY2025 (or trailing where FY-end falls outside calendar 2025), translated to USD at the FX rate disclosed in data/competition/peer_valuations.json. Yadea and Hero margin/growth figures are estimated from public IR summaries rather than full Fiscal coverage; Yamaha figures use the Japan FY ending March 2026.

The peer gap that matters:

Gogoro is the smallest, most leveraged, and lowest-margin name in the set. It trades at 1.44x EV/Sales — well above NIU (0.08x), in line with Yadea's profitable benchmark (0.43x), below the Indian EV growth story (Ola at 4.28x), and below the mature Japanese (Yamaha 0.48x) and Indian (Hero 1.74x) majors. On price-to-book at 0.59x, Gogoro is the cheapest in the set except NIU — both signal market skepticism about whether stated book value will hold.

The premium that GGR commands over NIU on EV/Sales (1.4x vs 0.1x) is explained almost entirely by net debt: NIU's enterprise value is artificially low because its cash exceeds its market cap. Gogoro's enterprise value is artificially high because $343M of net debt sits on top of a $64M equity stub. Look through to equity multiples and the two trade comparably.

Versus the Indian electric two-wheeler peers (Hero, Ola), Gogoro carries none of the growth premium and all of the execution risk. Hero earns 13% operating margins on $5.2B of revenue; Ola burns capital at -50% op margin but is priced for an India-EV growth thesis. Gogoro fits neither pattern: revenue is shrinking like a melting ice-cube hardware business while the battery-swap subscription line grows. The market has not awarded GGR a "platform / subscription" multiple — and absent a credible India scale-up, it probably will not.

Bottom line on peer comparison: Gogoro is not obviously mispriced versus peers. The 1.4x EV/Sales is defensible only if FCF turns positive and book value stops eroding. Against the only true direct comparable (NIU), GGR is more expensive on EV/Sales but offers a stronger recurring-revenue franchise; that trade-off is roughly a wash. The discount-to-book versus profitable peers (Yadea, Yamaha) is fully explained by Gogoro's continuing losses.

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What to Watch in the Financials

What the financials confirm: The business has a genuine, durable recurring revenue line (battery-swap, 665K subscribers, +8% growth) supported by ~$933M of cumulative network capex. The Q1 FY2026 gross margin print of 20.4% confirms the segment-mix shift is finally translating to P&L economics. Operating cash flow has held positive in every year since FY2022 ex-SPAC noise.

What the financials contradict: Revenue growth has not yet stabilized, the equity has lost 50% of its book value in four years, and leverage versus EBITDA is unworkable at any reasonable multiple. The bull case requires a margin level (20%+) that has held for one quarter and a capex profile ($65M/yr) that has held for one year — neither is yet a track record.

The first financial metric to watch is gross margin. If the Q1 FY2026 print of 20.4% holds or expands through the next two quarters, the operating loss narrows to a single-digit-millions level and FCF breakeven becomes a credible 12-18 month outcome. If gross margin reverts to the FY2024 low-single-digit level, every other line on this page — cash burn, refinancing risk, book-value erosion — gets worse, fast. Nothing else in the financials moves the equity more than that one ratio.